I. Introduction
This paper studies the convergence of least-squares learning mechanisms to limited information rational expectations equilibria. We study linear models in which agents have access to information on only a subset of the relevant state variables. The models cover situations in which there are distinct groups of differentially informed agents. We proceed by applying to our system the recently developed We received very extensive and useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper from Margaret Bray, Michele Boldrin, Robert E. Lucas,Jr., and an anonymous referee. We also thank Lawrence Christiano, Ramon Marimon, and Will Roberds for helpful discussions of issues related to this paper. Sargent's research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the University of Minnesota (SES-8508935).
"ordinary differential equations" approach of Ljung (1977) .' This involves extending some earlier results of Marcet and Sargent (1989) to handle situations with private information and hidden state variables. We give sufficient conditions for almost sure convergence to a limited information rational expectations equilibrium and describe necessary conditions for local convergence.
Our conditions for convergence restrict an operator that maps a set of perceived vector autoregressions into a set of actual (or optimal) vector autoregressions. This operator is determined by the particular economic model in hand. The operator is related to but distinct from the operator governing convergence in the class of models studied in Marcet and Sargent (1989) . The presence of private information and hidden state variables alters the relevant operator, in essence by composing the key operator in Marcet and Sargent with another "projection" operator.
Section II describes a class of models with limited and private information and asserts a convergence proposition for least-squares learning mechanisms.2 Section III applies our framework in order to formulate and compute the equilibrium of a version of Townsend's (1983) model. In his model, firms with private information face signal extraction problems involving endogenous variables whose laws of motion are themselves determined by the solutions of those signal extraction problems. Models with structures like Townsend's (see also Lucas 1975 ) have proved to be difficult to formulate in ways that facilitate computing their equilibria. The purpose of Section III is to show how our results on convergence of least-squares learning can be used to help in formulating these models and to suggest alternative tractable algorithms for computing their equilibria.
II. The Model and a Convergence Proposition
There is an n X 1 state vector z,. Let z,, be any n, X 1 vector z,, = eiz, where 1 cni ' 71 and ei are selector matrices for i = a, b, c, and d. ' The ordinary differential equations approach is described and applied by LjuLng and Sdderstr6m (1983) and Goodwin and Sin (1984) . See also Kushner and Clark (1978) . Woodf'ord (1986) applies some of' LjuLng's methods to a nonlinear dynamic model. 2 Bray's (1982) model and a version of ' Frydman's (1982) model are members of' the class of' models described in Sec. II. Analyses of' these models are contained in Marcet and Sargent (I 987). Papers about least-squares learning in models without hidden state variables include Bray and Savin (1986) and Fourgeauid, Gourieroux, and Pradel (1986). Marcet and Sargent (1988) present an informal interpretative survey of' the literature on least-squares learning. ' The ability to compute the equilibria of' these models rapidly would contribute to their being econometrically tractable. It is probably true that the technical difficulties in computing the equilibria of' models of' the style of ' Lucas (1975) and Townsend (1983) have impeded their adoption by other researchers. 
where Et is an m x 1 vector white noise with EEtE' = Q.,(I = (Isa, ib), and T and V are operators that map matrices into matrices conformable to the objects they operate on. A particular economic model will determine the operators T and V. In the next section, we describe a version of Townsend's model and display the operators T and V that are associated with it.
We are interested in regions of the parameter space P for which (2) implies that z, is a covariance stationary stochastic process. For this purpose, we define the following set: Two distinct sets, DI, and DC2 , are used in defining the projection facility in order to properly invoke some technical arguments made by Ljung (1977) . In practice, we shall be free to choose D21 to be a set contained within but arbitrarily close to DI1. In the applications below, we shall always think of D2J as being arbitrarily close to D1J and shall thus focus our attention on specification of the set DI1.4 If D2, = DI -R1k,)X(1/), then the "projection facility" on the second branch of (6b) is never invoked, and with suitable initial conditions, (6a)-(6b) simply become a recursive version of weighted least squares:
In the special case that {a;,} = {1}, the formula above is just ordinary ^ 
Ljung and S6derstr6m
(1983) frequently proceed in this way, specifying a projection facility in terms of' a single set.
1310
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY least squares. In cases in which a nontrivial projection facility is specified by choosing DI1 to be a proper subset of IR ?X(Ti), it is natural to set "some point in D2 " in (6b) equal to (I?t' R.,,), where t' is the last time that (Pi,, R11) E D21. With D21 set arbitrarily close to DI, (6) then amounts to least squares adjusted sequentially to ignore observations that threaten to drive (,( R-,) outside of the set DI_. When the sequence {cyt} is chosen to be strictly increasing, it leads to adjusting the least-squares algorithm to weight more recent observations more heavily. (The restriction that limbo c=, 1 restricts the eventual rate of forgetting in a way sufficient to permit convergence of j within the system to be studied below.)
The sets D1J and D21 will play important roles in one part of the proposition to be stated below. One role of the sets DI1 and D21 can be to force the learning algorithm to remain within the set D, defined above.
We assume that when agents are learning according to (6), the actual law of motion is determined by substituting P, = (IL, PO) from (6) for IP on the right side of (2):
The system that we want to study is (6) and (7). Associated with the system of stochastic difference equations (6) and ( 
Let {(P(t),
)},e1, denote the trajectories of (8). We define the set DA to be the domain of attraction of the fixed point ( R) of (8), which we assume to be unique. That is, DA consists of the set of (P(O), LEAST-SQUARES LEARNING LAL 1
R(O)) such that when (0(0), R(O)) C DA, then (8) implies lima ((t), R(t)) = (W /, R/).
We use a set of six assumptions about system (6)-(7), which are described in the Appendix.
Among these, the first five are in the nature of regularity conditions that are easy to verify and are typically satisfied for the kinds of applications we have encountered.
It bears mentioning that assumption 1, which states that S has a unique fixed point, could be relaxed to permit multiple fixed points. Then our propositions would transform to statements about each fixed point of Assumption 6 can be considerably more difficult to verify than 1-5. Assumption 6 is used in only the first part of our four-part proposition. For this first part, we also use the following assumption. Assume that the trajectories of (8) In the remainder of this paper we focus on another way that proposition 1 can be used, namely, to guide the computation of a rational expectations equilibrium. As a laboratory for our study, we use a model of Townsend for which the equilibrium has been difficult to formulate and to compute by means other than those suggested by proposition 1.
III. A Model of Townsend
This section uses an algorithm suggested by proposition 1 to compute the equilibrium of a version of Townsend's (1983) model. We adopt his formulation of the demand and cost structure but reformulate his way of modeling firms' forecasting problems. Townsend formulates that forecasting problem by imputing to firms more understanding of the economic structure than we do. He models each firm as knowing that the mean beliefs of firms in other industries are hidden state variables about whose laws of motion the firm itself forms beliefs. We model the firm as forecasting its own price by using a vector autoregression that includes its own price, the price of the other industry, and all other variables in its information set. This transformation of Townsend's "forecasting the forecasts of others" into the problem of 
Uj, = 0, + Ej1,
Ot= p0t-I + V,, p < 1,
where ( We assume that firms in each industry solve their optimization problem by positing that the variables in their information sets follow a vector autoregression. r They use this vector autoregression to solve the "prediction part" of the linear-quadratic control problem induced by (I(0).; In this section, we assume for convenience that firms in each industry fit a first-order vector autoregression to their observables.7
ti Because ot the linear-(quadratic structure of this problem, it separates into "control and "prediction" parts (see Sargent 1987, chap. 14) .
[ This is a restriction and causes the e(luilit)rium that we compute to deviate from the one that Iownsenld wotild recover as he drives toward infinity in his calculations in sec.
B1v modeling agents ats fitting tith-order vector autoregressions
and driving n to infinity, we woolul recover precisely Townsend's j = x tloel. We shall return to this point at the end of this se(ction.
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We now show how our version of Townsend's model can be mapped into the setup of Section II. The state and noise of the model at t are specified as 
Equations (15) and (18) have not calculated analytically the eigenvalues associated with the right side of (9), which would govern local stability of a leastsquares learning mechanism. For a system of this size, that is an impossible task. Instead, a numerical analysis of the differential equation (9) must be resorted to. To accomplish this, one needs formulas for T(Pil) and for the terms M,,,(P) -Mz, (I), which compose Sj(p). We use equation (18) 
for a small value of 'y > 0. We then used a finite difference method to evaluate the derivative matrix of the right side of (21) at the fixed point P/1 of (21) and computed the eigenvalues of this matrix.8 For each set of parameter values that we studied, our calculations indicate that the real parts of all eigenvalues are negative, implying that for these parameter values, a least-squares learning scheme would be locally stable. Tables 1-5 
where I is the identity matrix. Equation (24) are too short in the sense that in equilibrium, the prediction errors from these vector autoregressions will not be orthogonal to information lagged two or more periods. In effect, Townsend had in mind permitting agents to run infinite-order vector autoregressions, so that agents are conditioning on infinite histories of zet and zi,. There are two ways that one can think of modifying the present setup to capture the idea that agents condition on longer histories than we have permitted them to. The first is simply to let agents fit nth-order vector autoregressions and to think of increasing n toward infinity.'' The second is to model agents as making forecasts by fitting finite-order vector autoregressive, moving average (ARMA) processes. We conjecture that by adopting this second path, one could adapt the framework of this paper to compute exactly the equilibrium that Townsend would recover by driving j toward infinity. We also suspect that by specifying a recursive estimator for learning the vector ARMA process (see Ljung and Sdderstrom 1983), a modified version of proposition 1 of this paper would apply and would support Townsend's equilibrium as a limit point.
IV. Extensions
From this paper, there naturally emerge several alternative methods for computing a rational expectations equilibrium for a linear model in which agents have limited information.
Solving the differential equation (9) numerically is one such method since the limit point, if there is one, is a rational expectations equilibrium. Another method consists of simulating the least-squares learning model (6)-(7). Once the mappings T and V are known, the model with learning is very easy to simulate since these equations have a recursive structure. The method of simulating the learning model has the disadvantage that it requires computing a realization of a pseudo random process for a sufficiently long realization to assure convergence.
In practice, it can be difficult to assure that a realization of the process has indeed converged. Against this difficulty is balanced the reward that simulations less than one}, 0, always converged to the sane rational expectations eqnilibri-mL11. Consequently, we suspect that, for Townsend's model, (9) is globally stable.
' l For reasons related to the infinite regress problems of Townsend ( 1 983), it can be shown that there is no finite-order vector antoregression that is long enough to make the prediction errors orthogonal to the Hilbert space generated by the infinite past history of agents' information.
